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1JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(4) as this is an appeal of a final order of the Third District Court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL
Rule 60(b)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in furtherance of
justice relieve a party. . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party.     
 STATEMENT OF CASE
Express Recovery Services, Inc., (“Express”) brought this contract action against
Kamran Monjazeb (“Monjazeb”) personally, doing business as A-A Better Roofing, for
failure to pay for advertising services to Phone Directories Company, Inc. (“Directories”).
Monjazeb signed two contracts with Directories, one dated February 20, 2007, and the other
dated February 7, 2006.  Monjazeb failed to pay for the services rendered by Directories and
therefore legal proceedings were initiated.  Monjazeb filed a timely answer and subsequently
Express filed an Amended Complaint because Monjazeb made a partial payment after he was
served the 10-day summons and complaint.  
Monjazeb did not answer the amended complaint.  Express then filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment.  Monjazeb filed a timely response stating  “I Kamron Monjazeb strongly
disagree with the accusations [and] I have sufficient Documents to prove beyond doubt that
2I DO NOT OWE ANY money to the Plaintiff.”  (Emphasis in response).  Monjazeb failed
to provide any affidavits or exhibits to his response.  The Third District Court Judge Robert
Adkins granted Summary Judgment to Express.  
Monjazeb filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment and for the first time alleged
fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3).
Monjazeb stated for the first time that he inserted new terms to the 2006 contract.  He alleges
that the terms of the contract were changed and that Directories failed to comply with those
terms.  Monjazeb has not alleged any defenses to the 2007 contract.  His Motion to Set Aside
was denied.          
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Monjazeb signed two contracts with Phone Directories (Addendum:
Exhibit 1 and 2).
2. Monjazeb failed to pay for the services rendered by Directories. 
3.  Monjazeb has presented no defense for his failure to pay the 2007 contract
with Directories.
4.  Monjazab inserted new terms to the 2006 contract. 
5.  There is notation of any sort to indicate that Directories assented to the new
terms or modification proposed by Monjazeb. 
   6.  Monjazeb did not express any concerns with the 2006 contract and signed a
new contract in 2007.  
3SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Monjazeb signed two contracts with Directories and failed to pay for the services
provided.  Monjazeb does not present any defense to the 2007 contract.  As to the 2006
contract.  Monjazeb inserted new terms to the contract: “our Full page Ad must be the 1st or
2nd (only after Kimbal[l] roofing) per Kim Blomseth or void the whole thing,  with full
refund.”  Directories published the 2006 ad and the Monjazeb’s ad was placed in the 3rd
position behind Kimball Roofing.        
ARGUMENT
I. MONJAZEB HAS PRESENTED NO DEFENSE TO THE 2007
CONTRACT WITH DIRECTORIES
Monjazeb signed a contract in 2007 for services with Directories.  Monjazeb has not
paid Directories for that service.  Monjazeb has not presented any objection, defense, or any
reason whatsoever for his refusal to pay for the 2007 service.  Therefore the trial courts
summary judgment should be affirmed as to the amounts owed on the 2007 contract.    
II. MONJAZEB’S ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE TERMS OF THE 2006
CONTRACT WAS NOT ASSENTED TO BY DIRECTORIES
Monjazeb altered the Advertising Contract by inserting new terms to the contract.
Monjazeb inserted, “our Full page Ad must be the 1st or 2nd (only after Kimbal roofing) per
Kim Blomseth or void the whole thing with full refund.”   
This modification requires assent on the part of Directories.  “Parties to a contract
may, by mutual consent, modify any or all of the contract.”  Pasker, Gould, Ames & Weaver,
4Inc., v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 877 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).  “A valid modification of a contract
. . . requires ‘a meeting of the minds of the parties, . . .’ ” Richard Barton Enters., Inc. v.
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 61, 362 P.2d
427, 428 (1961).  The parties had a valid contract for a full page ad in the 2006 phone
directory.  Directories performed and Monjazeb failed to pay. 
A valid modification requires the same meeting of minds as is necessary to make the
contract in the first place.  Scott v. Majors, 1999 UT App 139, ¶ 16, 980 P.2d 214.  Here
there was no meeting of the minds, no mutual consent, and therefore no valid modification.
It is clear Directories did not assent to the modification in that its performance (the
publishing Monjazeb’s ad) did not place the ad in the 1st or 2nd position behind Kimball
Roofing.  See Novell, Inc., v. Canopy Group, Inc., 2004 Utah App 162; 92 P.3d 768.
Further, there is no indication or notation signed or initialed by Directories that they assented
to the new terms presented by Monjazeb.  
Paragraph 1, Terms and Conditions of the Advertising Contract between Monjazeb
and Directories states in relevant part:  “Neither party shall be bound by any special
arrangements contrary to or in addition to the terms and conditions as stated herein or written
hereon, and no agent or employee of the Publisher has the authority to vary any terms of this
application.”  Therefore, the Terms and Conditions specifically prohibit Monjazeb’s
modification of the contract.  Clearly, parties to a written contract may modify any or all of
the contract, even if the contract has a provision that prohibits said modification, provided
5there is “mutual consent.”  Softsolutions, Inc., v. Brigham Young University, 2000 UT 46
¶ 34; 1 P.3d 1095.  Directories denies any mutual consent in our present case.  
 Monjazeb accepted the benefits of the 2006 ad and failed to express any displeasure
or reservation until his Motion to Set Aside Judgment.  This is the first time Monjazeb notes
that his ad was not in the position he alleged was promised.  Not only did Monjazeb fail to
object to the placement of his 2006 advertisement, he signed a new contract for the 2007
directory.  
Clearly, if Monjazeb believed he had a defense to paying the 2006 contract, he would
have mentioned this prior to entering into a new contract.  His inaction constitutes a waiver
of any defense he may have asserted.  Continental Ins. Co. v. Kingston, 2005 UT App 233,
¶¶ 10-14; 114 P.3d 1158.  It is worth noting that the placement of the Kimball Roofing
advertisement appeared on page 807 of the directory and the A-A Better Roofing
advertisement appeared on page 810; one page behind the requested placement.
This court may affirm the summary judgment awarded to Plaintiff on any legal ground
or theory, even though not raised in the lower court.  Ivie v. Hickman, 2004 UT App 469,
¶ 8; 105 P.3d 946.  The 2006 contract with the insertions and attempted modification by
Monjazeb may be affirmed through unjust enrichment or quantum meruit.  Monjazeb
requested Directories publish his full page ad in the 2006 directory; Directories expected to
be paid by Monjazeb; and Monjazeb knew that Directories expected payment for the
publication.  Uhrhahn Const. & Design v. Hopkins, 2008 UT App 41; 179 P.3d 808.  With
6all of the elements of a quantum meruit claim present, this Court may affirm the trial court’s
summary judgment on that ground.      
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment awarded Express should be affirmed.  There is no question
that Monjazeb owes Directories for the 2007 contract.  As to the 2006 contract, this court
may affirm the summary judgment awarded to Plaintiff on any legal ground or theory, even
though not raised in the lower court.  Therefore, even though summary judgment was based
partially on the 2006 contract that did not have the language inserted by Monjazeb, this Court
may still affirm on an unjust enrichment or quantum meruit theory.      
DATED this ___ day of October, 2009.
________________________________
Samuel S. McHenry 
Attorney for Appellee
7CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ____ day of October, 2009, I caused to be mailed via U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE
EXPRESS RECOVERY SERVICES to the following:
Jay L. Kessler
9087 West 2700 South, Suite 9
Magna, Utah 84044
Attorney for Appellant
______________________________
8ADDENDUM
Exhibit A- 2006 Contract between Monjazeb and Phone Directories
Exhibit B- 2007 Contract between Monjazeb and Phone Directories
Exhibit C- Invoice for 2006 Contract.
Exhibit D- Invoice for 2007 Contract.
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